Freyberg split up his forces into three areas, correctly assuming (and with intelligence from ULTRA), that the expected German invasion would aim for the three main airfields at Maleme, Rethymnon and Heraklion.  Unfortunately Freyberg did not maintain control of his central reserve, he left it available to his sector commanders.  Also while the airfields, especially Maleme, were recognized as vital points to be held in the coming invasion, Freyberg's commanders had not sufficiently concentrated their own forces to effectively counter the expected enemy attacks.  The forces available to Puttick west of Chania were spread along Prison Valley, Galatas, the coastal road and finally Maleme and Hill 107.  The area west of the Tavronitis river was left dangerously under-manned, with consequent results when the Germans attacked.

Para. 6.  It is interesting to speculate as to whether the adoption of the second solution might have been more profitable.  MALEME aerodrome might have remained intact and the rapid reinforcement by airborne troops greatly delayed.  It is even possible that the enemy might have been discouraged from continuing his attempts.  But the aerodrome at Heraklion remained intact and yet the enemy were able to land troop carriers to the east and out of reach.  The garrisons would in any case have been pinned under the combined efforts of the encircling parachutists and the permanent air threat overhead.  Other landing grounds would soon have been prepared by the parachutists.  They had started to prepare one in the valley behind the prison.  Furthermore, the Navy was powerless to stop an eventual landing by sea.  Indeed, according to the German accounts, the Italians landed in the east of the island on the 28th; nor had General FREYBURG [sic] the resources with which to form a mobile reserve to meet such a threat.  The vast length of the coast line and the number of possible landing beaches should constantly be borne in mind.  Moreover, the means for reconnaissance seaward were lacking and the garrison was virtually blind.  It is noteworthy that as a result of the disposition adopted, nearly all the parachutists that landed could not fail to descend near some of the defending troops."

Tactically, his sector commanders were to employ camouflage to minimize the effects of the expected aerial attacks by fighter bombers.  Then when the paratroops were down, but before they had time to collect their weapons and reform their units they would come under strong and immediate counter-attack.  Sadly this was not the way the battle went.  The lack of concentration of force at the expected landing points (particularly Maleme), the tendency of senior commanders to operate from HQs a considerable distance from the fighting and a lack of decisive and imaginative command by those senior commanders meant that the advantage swung to the Germans.  As commander of the forces on Crete Freyberg must take responsibility for the actions of his senior commanders.  The official New Zealand history said;

"The conclusion is inevitable that he began with a battle plan which gave his battalion commanders too much choice of role with too little guidance on which roles were prior [and] that in the battle itself he failed to give his commanders firm directions."

On the 26th May Freyberg realised the position was hopeless, and at 09:30 he sent a message to Wavell;

"..the limit of endurance has been reached by troops under my command at Suda Bay.  No matter what decision is taken by the Commander-in-Chief, from a military point of view the position is hopeless.."

Following the withdrawal, in June of 1942, Brigadier Inglis of 4th New Zealand who had served on Crete under Freyberg, was in England and was asked to brief Churchill on what he believed had happened.  He was very critical of Freyberg.  Churchill's comments later were;

"I am far from reassured about the tactical conduct of the defense by General Freyberg.... There appears to have been no counter-attack of any kind in the Western sector until more than 36 hours after the airborne descents had begun.  There was no attempt to form a mobile reserve of the best troops....  The whole seems to have been of static defence of positions, instead of the rapid extirpation at all costs of the airborne landing parties."

In the view of General Mark Clark (himself a controversial character) Freyberg was; "..a prima donna and had to be handled with kid gloves..."  Major General Tuker, C.O. of 4th Indian Division said of Freyberg; "..brave as a lion but no planner of battles and a niggler in action."

One of those with Freyberg at Cassino and Crete was Brigadier General Kippenberger.  At one point during the Cassino campaign he tried to arrange a meeting between himself and another Divisional Commander, with Freyberg.  Freyberg refused saying " ..he was not going to have any soviet of divisional commanders."  This was at variance with his earlier command of the NZ Division when "..plans would be fully, and even outspokenly, debated  Freyberg would listen carefully to everyone in turn, then sum up and make the final decision."  Although Churchill wanted Freyberg in command on Crete, where he was commanding a force larger than a division, maybe as Tuker and Clark would later assert, he was out of his depth above divisional command.