The Argylls

A recurring theme in the narrative of the involvement of the A&SH is the poor level of communication on the island, and between different units. It is probably fair to assume that other British units suffered similar problems. "During the ten days of the battle we, in the Heraklion centre, knew little or nothing as to how the other sectors were faring, for communications between the sectors were almost non-existent, and we relied almost entirely on the BBC news bulletins to keep us informed as to how the battle was going in the other sectors and on the sea."
On the 15th May, prior to the German invasion the battalion was in the western desert performing guard duties. The confusion they would experience over the coming weeks started from square one as they received a warning order that they may move, this was cancelled a few hours later, only to find that again later that day they were ordered to move. Around midnight 16/17 May they were told they were destined for Crete aboard HMS Glengyle, and they were set three specific tasks on the island;
(a) The defence of Messara Plain and its preparation as an emergency landing-ground for the RAF.
(b) To watch for possible parachute landings on Nida Plateau, in the hills north-west of Ay Deka.
(c) The defence of the beach we landed at, as it was expected to land further reinforcements at the same place.
The landing was planned to be by landing craft at Tymbaki, but they had no information as to its suitability as there had been no aerial reconnaissance. They would in fact be the last battalion to land on Crete, and their landing strength would include three infantry tanks. They were told that the German attack might start on the 19th May, and the battalion should not expect air support because of enemy air superiority. "This forecast was to prove remarkably accurate, except that the expected enemy air superiority in the early stages was to turn out to be complete air monopoly during all the stages of the battle. The complete control of the air by the Germans was destined to hamper and restrict all our movements by day to such an extent that we were powerless to intervene and prevent the continual build up of enemy troops and supplies, and equally powerless to reinforce our own dwindling man power."
The Glengyle was one of three cargo ships which had been converted at the beginning of the war to carry troops and landing craft. She was due to berth at Alexandria at 18:30 on the 17th May. The following extract gives some indication of the problems of loading ships for a landing, especially with changing timetables.
"The ship did not eventually arrive until 20:30 on 17th May, and we found it sadly deficient of landing craft. Instead of its normal complement of two motor landing craft (M.L.C.) and twelve assault landing craft (A.L.C.), it actually carried three of the former and four of the latter, and this deficiency of A.L.C. was obviously going to make more difficult the landing in Crete, as instead of the normal two flights, several flights would be necessary to land the Battalion and all its stores. the time factor, therefore, became an immediate problem.
Three parties had to have a say in the timing. Firstly, the Royal Navy, who said that the ship must leave Crete for its return journey not later than 04:00 hours on the night selected for arrival. Then the Captain of the ship estimated he would require 24 hours to make the crossing. Finally, we had to estimate how long it would take us to off load troops and stores in the few landing craft available. Ours was a difficult problem as we had no information as to how close to the shore the ship would anchor, and this factor was going to affect the number of flights the landing craft could make from ship to shore and back. We also had to bear in mind that off loading at Crete by manual labour in the dark would take much longer than to load at Alexandria, a port equipped with all modern loading facilities. We estimated that, if we had everything stacked ready to put ashore, we should require not less than four hours. This meant we must arrive not later than midnight on 18th - 19th May, and so leave Alexandria at midnight on 17th - 18th May. It was then 20:30 hrs., and this left only 3.5 hours available to embark the Battalion and load some 130 tons of stores, which had been stacked for us in the docks at Alexandria.
It was quite impossible to load all these supplies in the time available, and even if it had been possible, they could not have been put ashore at the other end. The 130 tons represented 30 days' supplies, and included aviation petrol, and other material for the RAF. We decided that the maximum amount we could reasonably expect to off load in Crete was 10 days' supplies, exclusive of some 50 tons of Battalion baggage and stores, and it was agreed that we should load accordingly, provided we included the RAF stores. As it turned out, this proved to be an accurate estimate, and the ship could have been cleared in Crete if it had not been for some unforeseen and unavoidable delays. It was very unfortunate that so much stress was laid on the importance of loading the RAF stores, as it must have been known that the existing landing grounds were already out of action and that RAF participation in the defence of the island had already ceased." Even after all the problems there were further delays due to air-raids, the ship eventually sailed at 01:00 on 18 May. "The voyage was uneventful." Although spotted by an aircraft at 18:00 there was no air attack to follow.
The Glengyle anchored about a half mile off Crete at 23:30 "on a fine still night" for the battalion to move ashore. Problems continued however, and the first wave did not arrive ashore until nearly 03:00on 19th May, and the ship was due to leave again at 04:00! When the ship sailed punctually it had only landed a small percentage of the necessary petrol, which would prove to be a serious problem. The MLC's did not return to the ship, and one would be later used to escape from the island.
Having arrived on the island they needed to conceal themselves from aerial observation and so lay under cover during all the daylight hours of the 19th. Mindful of their set objectives, Lt. Guy Valentine was to take a unit to investigate the suitability of the area for an emergency landing ground, and he reported the area south of Ay Deka as ideal. By the 20th the tanks and transports had arrived and were off-loaded at Tymbaki and all companies were ready, in position and with slit trenches dug. On the 20th the CO went to Heraklion to visit Brigadier Chappel commanding the 14th Brigade for the defence of the Heraklion area.
The fact that the German attack/invasion really had begun did not become apparent to those at Heraklion until about 17:00 when some 200 Ju52's arrived at 300 feet and proceeded to drop some 2,000 parachutists. Some of these were on the Heraklion - Ay Deka road at the Kaireti Farm, cutting communications between the battalion and 14th Brigade so making the Farm an objective in an attack by the battalion on the 24th May. These landings were met by a series of counter attacks and by 21:30 the British area was pretty well clear of the enemy. "The success of the counter attacks was due to the speed with which they were launched, to the good look-outs which had been kept, and to the fact that they were carried out on the initiative of the local sub-unit."

Although the Germans had landed at 17:00 there was no message from Brigade HQ to the Argylls at Ay Deka. Word only came when "a party of 20 RAF personnel arrived at our HQ and told us that they had been unable to get into Heraklion as they had run into heavy machine-gun fire north of Gournies". They volunteered to form themselves into a RAF platoon and fight with the Argylls. By now the road to Heraklion was cut and communication difficulties were going to pose serious problems, "at no time during the next ten days were we able to establish any kind of communication with Brigade by means of wireless." The only road route open now was Ay Deka, Praetorius, Heraklion, but the road to Praetorius was little more than a sandy track. To communicate with Heraklion a convoluted system of phone calls between police stations and their onward transmission by dispatch rider was used, which meant a delay of up to 6 hours for a response to an urgent message. The battalion spent the 21st around Ay Deka with the intent of continuing to pursue their objectives set before leaving Egypt. Meanwhile 14 Brigade continued their action at Heraklion against the German troops who were consolidating their position on the ground.

For the area from Tymbaki to Heraklion, see the detailed map. I have used place name spellings from the "Thin Red Line" article. They are different to those on the map. Tymbaki = Timpaki, Ay Deka = Agii Deka, Praetorius = Pirgos