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[VII.1.]
are in their objective orientation, or in their orientation
to the object, the appropriation of the object, the appropriation
of human reality. Their orientation to the object is the manifestation
of the human reality, it is human activity and human suffering,
For suffering, humanly considered, is a kind of self-enjoyment of
man.
Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is
only ours when we have it, when it exists for us as capital, or
when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc.; in
short, when it is used by us. Although private property itself
again conceives all these direct realisations of possession only as means
of life, and the life which they serve as means is the life of
private property - labour and conversion into capital.
Displacing all physical and mental senses there has therefore come
the sheer estrangement of all these senses, the sense of having.
The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty so that
he might yield his inner wealth to the outer world. (On the category of
'having' - see Hess in the Emundtwanzig Bogen.)
The abolition of private property is thus the comprehensive emancipation
of all human senses and qualities, but it is this emancipation exactly
because these senses and attributes have become, subjectively and objectively,
human. The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has become
a social, human object - an object made by man for man. The senses
have therefore become directly in their practice theoreticians.
They relate themselves to the thing for the sake of the thing,
but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and
to man, and vice versa. Need or enjoyment has consequently lost
its egotistical nature, and nature has lost its mere utility
by use becoming human use.
[VIII.?.]
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[VII.2.]
In the same way, the senses and enjoyment of other men have become my
own appropriation. Besides these direct organs, hence, social
organs develop in the form of society; therefore, for instance,
activity in direct association with others, etc., has become an organ
for expressing my own life, and a mode of appropriating
human life.
It is obvious that the human eye enjoys things in a way different
from the base, non-human eye; the human ear different from the
base ear, etc.
We have seen that man does not lose himself in his object only when the
object becomes for him a human object or objective man. This is
possible only when the object becomes for him a social object,
he himself for himself a social being, just as society becomes a being
for him in this object.
On the one hand, therefore, it is only when the objective world becomes
for man everywhere in society the world of man's essential powers - human
reality, and for that reason the reality of his own essential power
- that all objects become for him the objectification of
himself, become objects which confirm and realise his individuality, become
his objects: that is, man himself becomes the object. The
manner in which they become his depends on the nature
of the objects and on the nature of the essential power corresponding
to it; for it is precisely the determinate nature of this
relationship which shapes the particular, real mode of affirmation.
To the eye an object comes to be other than it is to the ear,
and the object of the eye is another object than the object of the
ear. The specific character of each essential power is--its specific
essence, and therefore also the specific mode of its objectification,
of its objectively actual, living being. Thus man is affirmed
in the objective world not only in the act of thinking,
[VIII.1.]
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